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Abstract—During the COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic,
Contact Tracing emerged as an essential tool for managing the
epidemic. App-based solutions have emerged for Contact Tracing,
including a protocol designed by Apple and Google (influenced by
an open-source protocol known as DP3T). This protocol contains
two well-documented de-anonymisation attacks. Firstly that when
someone is marked as having tested positive and their keys
are made public, they can be tracked over a large geographic
area for 24 hours at a time. Secondly, whilst the app requires
a minimum exposure duration to register a contact, there is
no cryptographic guarantee for this property. This means an
adversary can scan Bluetooth networks and retrospectively find
who is infected. We propose a novel ”cross hashing” approach
to cryptographically guarantee minimum exposure durations. We
further mitigate the 24-hour data exposure of infected individuals
and reduce computational time for identifying if a user has been
exposed using k-Anonymity buckets of hashes and Private Set
Intersection.
Index Terms—Contact Tracing, Anonymisation, k-Anonymity,
Private Set Intersection
I. INTRODUCTION
Contact tracing systems are based on sharing of individual’s
presence through short-range Bluetooth beacons and enable
individuals to determine if and when they have been in
contact with an infected person [1]. If used by enough people,
epidemic control can be achieved without resorting to country-
wide ”lockdown” strategies which are harmful to society
and the economy [2]. At the same time pervasive tracking
of people locations raised serious privacy concerns globally
including potential risk to human rights with claims that
excessively compromising privacy is a gateway to undermining
other rights [3].
While a number of privacy-aware protocols have been
proposed, many do not protect the privacy of the person
once he or she becomes infected and allow sharing his or
her location information. The area is rapidly evolving with
numerous privacy aware protocols developed and deployed up
to date [4] [5]. In particular, Apple and Google, who control
the overwhelming market share of mobile phone operating
systems, have created a BLE-based protocol for contact tracing
[5], based on DP3T, an open-source contact tracing protocol
using hash-based cryptography to achieve anonymity. The pro-
tocols protect the users’ privacy by encrypting their beacon IDs
with temporal daily keys, which are created by the individual
and can be disseminated in the event a user tested positive.
However, once an infected user shares his daily temporal key,
it becomes possible to track his or her entire daily trajectory.
In fact, a formal analysis of DP3T has revealed that it is
possible for ”malicious users to re-identify infected users at
scale” [4]. As the locations of infected individuals tend to
attract extensive news coverage and re-identification leading to
unwanted privacy invasion and public distain, this represents
a serious issue [6].
Another concern is that the location information of an
infected person becomes available to anyone who recorded
at least one beacon, i.e. passersbys, various Bluetooth trackers
installed in various locations, i.e. to users who have not been in
a meaningful contact with the infected person and therefore are
not supposed to have access to the infected person’s location
information.
In this paper, we propose a privacy aware contact tracing
approach that ensures the privacy of the person even after
they become infected. The novelty of the approach is that
we choose to protect the proximity information not at the
individual beacon level but on the encounter level of a certain
biologically meaningful duration. The approach ensures that
location information is shared only with individuals who
have spent a minimum sufficient duration in the proximity
of the infected individual reducing the risk of re-identification
attacks. Furthermore, by cryptographically signing encounters
the approach ensures that once the infected individual shares
his or her location information, it is not possible for a
malicious user to re-identify the person or reconstruct his
trajectory.
II. RELATED WORK
Re-identification attacks of anonymised datasets have been
explored before in literature, a description of the problem can
be found in [7]. During the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, notes
a number of privacy controversies in South Korea through
the implementation of Information Technology contact tracing
systems; with the locations of infected individuals attracting
extensive news coverage and re-idenitification allegedly lead-
ing to unwanted privacy invasion and public distain.
The [5] protocol by Apple and Google works by generating
a Temporary Exposure Keys (otherwise known as a Daily
Tracing Key, a random number which is SHA-256 hashed
and truncated to 16 bytes), this daily key is then in turn
used to generate Rolling Proximity Identifiers for each 10
minute interval in the 24 hour period. The Rolling Proximity
Identifiers is created by concatenating the Temporary Exposure
Key with a timestamp value, computing a SHA-256 hash and
truncating it to 16 bytes. In the event an infection is detected,
the Temporary Exposure Keys are distributed and users can
generate each Rolling Proximity Identifiers to check if they
encountered an infected individual.
The [5] protocol shares the same flaw as DP3T in that the
Temporary Exposure Keys are widely circulated, allowing for
re-identification of infected users. Finally, the protocol derives
new Rolling Proximity Identifiers at a fixed time interval
regardless of other characteristics (such as distance travelled),
raising the possibility of tracing journeys travelled by users.
The key issue to solve here is allowing for users to compute
the Rolling Proximity Identifiers of users they may have
come into contact with without leaking the information of all
affected users. Developers of contact tracing apps [8] have
sought guidance on implementing my original k-Anonymity
communication protocol [9] to mitigate this effect (a protocol
originally devised for compromised credential checking).
It is noted in [10] that this risk is not sufficiently mitigated
in existing protocols; the paper discusses that an attacker
can passively collect proximity identifiers and then target that
person if their diagnosis key is later disclosed and note that k-
Anonymity may offer a solution to this problem. This risk is
further discussed in [4] and notes that this is a substantial
problem to address, noting ”the only way to mitigate this
attack is to deny the same privileges as the apps to individuals”
and suggesting it could require a challenging deployment of
hardware encryption (TPM chips) to address.
Our prior work in [11] provides an empirical comparison of
compromised credential checking (C3) protocols and defines
novel protocols for minimising information loss. Whilst pure
Private Set Intersection has a heavy computational and com-
munication overhead, [12] has combined k-Anonymous proto-
cols with Private Set Intersection to reduce this burden. Most
recently support for response padding has been introduced into
the original k-Anonymity protocol to prevent inference on the
wire of encrypted contents [13].
Wireless scanner equipment using MAC address tracking
has been deployed for monitoring pedestrian and cyclist jour-
ney time, monitoring road conditions in real-time and pas-
senger movements throughout train stations. Such continuous
tracking over a large geographical scale has raised serious
privacy concerns amongst governments and the general public.
In [14], we provided a novel practical hash-based approach to
anonymising such MAC Addresses at the point of collection.
This approach was designed for use-cases like Journey Time
Monitoring Systems which do not rely on client-side software
to allow for the anonymisation of data, nevertheless the paper
provides a formal model for anonymising wireless unique
identifiers, which is of relevance to this work.
III. THREAT MODEL
The Contact Tracing protocol described in [5] works by a
user randomly generating a Temporary Exposure Keys (for-
merly known as a Daily Tracing Key) which is 16 bytes long
and generated from a cryptographic random number generator
(CRNG). The device stores one Temporary Exposure Key per
day up to a maximum of 14 keys (covering a 14 day period).
A Rolling Proximity Identifier (RPI) is derived by hashing
the Temporary Exposure Key together with an integer count of
the 10 minute interval associated to that 14 day period. This
RPI is broadcast and collected by other users.
In the event the user is found to have tested positive for the
virus, they may disclose their Temporary Exposure Keys to a
server. Users may then download a list of Temporary Exposure
Keys and compute the RPIs for each 10 minute interval to see
if they were exposed to the virus.
An adversary may passively scan for RPIs broadcast over a
geographic area. Using lists of Temporary Exposure Keys they
are able to identify and trace infected individuals throughout
a large geographic area for that 24 hour period using wireless
sensors installed on public transportation networks, motorway
Bluetooth Journey Time Monitoring Systems or even rubbish
bins [14].
Accordingly, the threat is not merely that an adversary may
identify an infected individual, but that they may also trace
them over a large geographic scale for a 24 hour period.
The [5] protocol requires public health authorities set a
minimum threshold for time spent together for an encounter to
the counted, this value must be greater than 5 minutes. A user
must be in contact for at least 5 minutes for a match to be
registered and no further data is logged beyond 30 minutes
of exposure. It is important to note that an adversary can
passively collect RPIs without any need to have due regard
for the minimum exposure threshold.
IV. ANONYMITY MODEL
We seek to limit information leakage by the server contain-
ing the Daily Tracing Keys of users whilst allowing users to
validate if they have been exposed. We propose two modifi-
cations to the protocol to enhance privacy; the first provides
a cryptographic guarantee that a user must be contact with
another for a minimum duration before a contact is established
and the second provides efficient lookups of RPIs without the
need to disclose the Temporary Exposure Keys for that 24
hour period.
A. Cryptographic Contact Duration Threshold
In the current protocol, contact duration thresholds are
set through software configuration rather than part of the
cryptographic specification. By providing a cryptographically
guaranteed contact duration threshold, we are able to limit
information exposure before that threshold is met.
We propose that the Rolling Proximity Identifiers (RPIs)
are rotated at the same frequency as the minimum contact
threshold. Contact events are registered by computing a hash
of the current RPI and one of the previous RPI value, we refer
to this as a Consistent Contact Identifier (CCI). To identify
exposures later, a user can search for these CCIs from a remote
server.
Where RPIs generated from a device during the course of
a day are represented as RPIs = {i1, i2, ..., in}, a CCI for a
given period can be computed as CCI = HKDF (in, in−1),
where HKDF refers to the HKDF hash function used by the
[5] protocol (adopted from IETF RFC 5869).
As an alternative configuration; in the event that the mini-
mum contact threshold is higher than the interval used to rotate
the Rolling Proximity Identifiers (RPIs), a CCI should instead
be computed as CCI = HKDF (in, in−k), k ≥ 1 where k
is the number of RPI steps required to achieve the minimum
contact threshold.
In lieu of a user downloading a list of Temporary Ex-
posure Keys from users who are exposed to the virus, we
propose users instead obtain a list of CCIs of exposed users.
This prevents a user being identified as exposed unless the
interaction was for the minimum contact duration threshold
and constrains any tracking to the period of time around the
immediate contact. By cross hashing RPIs together, we are
able to achieve a minimum time using standard cryptographic
primitives.
B. Efficient Rolling Proximity Identifier Search
The advantage of supplying and downloading the daily
Temporary Exposure Keys to users is that there is a lower
communication overhead than downloading all RPIs or our
proposed CCIs. With RPIs rotated every 10 minutes, there are
144 times the number of keys to download. If the rotation
duration is decreased to every 5 minutes, there are 288
times the number of keys to download over simply providing
Temporary Exposure Keys.
Alongside the higher communication overhead created
through the creation of CCIs, knowledge of Temporary Ex-
posure Keys allows a user to be tracked for a 24 hour period
if they test positive.
We seek to allow a user to query CCIs whilst minimising the
privacy loss both on the server and for the client. Fortunately,
this is a well explored problem in [9], [11], [12].
When a user’s Temporary Exposure Key is uploaded to a
server, the CCIs are computed for the period of exposure.
They are then stored in k-Anonymous buckets described in
[9]. The client simply needs to truncate the CCI hash to a
desired number of bits such to grant anonymity (we provide
both formal definitions and empirical analysis for applying k-
Anonymity to hash based data sets in [14]). As such buckets
are queried on the basis of CCI hashes instead of the RPIs or
Temporary Exposure Keys, no additional information is leaked
(for more information on data leakage risks see the section on
”Identifier-Based Bucketization” in [11]).
As a further safeguard against excessive data leakages,
look-ups within those buckets are performed using Private
Set Intersection (PSI). An approach for implementing Private
Set Intersection in k-Anonymous buckets is described in
further detail in [12] using a Diffie-Hellman based approach.
Private Set Intersection allows two parties to determine the
intersection of two sets of data without disclosing either set to
the other party. During a k-Anonymous search protocol, this
means the client discloses a partial hash as the search partition
and then both parties are able to determine if the content of the
clients search is in that partition without needing to disclosure
any further information. Unlike the approach detailed in [9],
this provides further cryptographic shielding of the hashes held
by the server.
As a final security measure, to prevent an adversary deter-
mining the number of daily contacts through passive analysis
(as analysed in [13]), provision should be made for the number
of requests to be padded with random data.
V. DISCUSSION
Our proposed amendments to the protocol mitigates passive
de-anonymisation attacks in two ways; the first is by requiring
a contact to last for longer than the minimum duration for a
user to know if another user is infected and the second prevents
whole-day tracking in instances where the user is infected.
The cross hashing approach used to mitigate such attacks
necessitates more hashes per infected user (protecting in-
formation at an encounter level) and accordingly a higher
communication overhead. We mitigate this by allowing the
client to search in k-Anonymous buckets which reduces the
communication overhead and reduces data leakage by the
server through the use of Private Set Intersection. Nevertheless,
this results in some data leakage.
There is a trade-off to this approach; to ensure both com-
munication overhead remains low and prevent re-identification
attacks, the user must disclose the first few bits of two hashed
Rolling Proximity Identifiers. The risk associated to such a
protocol is well documented in [11] and formal analysis of the
properties of anonymised hashes can be found in [14]. Such
protocols have been used widely in compromised credential
checking systems, a privacy sensitive context.
Nevertheless, even without preventing such de-
anonymisation attacks; communication overhead may be
a future problem in the existing protocol as it grows
linearly to the number of positive tests (regardless of user
interactions). Once a user is infected, a Temporary Exposure
Key of 16 bytes must be stored for 14 days. This means
the communication overhead of downloading Temporary
Exposure Keys exceeds 100 MB after 446429 users have
tested positive. Similarly, depending on the number of
infected users and communication limitations, cross hashing
may be deployed as a standalone measure meaning no data
leakage is necessitated.
This approach mitigates, but does not eliminate, de-
anonymisation attacks. An active attacker who approaches
a users smartphone for longer than the Contact Duration
Threshold can still determine if the user later tested positive.
We do however eliminate the risk of tracking over a 24 hour
period.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have provided a practical approach for mit-
igating passive de-anonymisation attacks on the Google/Apple
Contact Tracing Protocol [5]. We provide a novel cross
hashing approach to provide a cryptographic guarantee that
a contact is only registered when two devices have been
in contact for a minimum duration. We further reduce the
communication overhead of this protocol using k-Anonymity
buckets of hashes and Private Set Intersection.
The work in this paper provides a tangible proposal rectify-
ing weaknesses in the anonymity scheme used in the existing
protocol. We hope to expand this work with formal and
empirical analysis of the protocols with this configuration.
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